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Abstract  
A new foundational technology is emerging expected to bear great impact and reshape the financial               
industry. This technology is called blockchain. Further, blockchain is challenging the status quo of              
business models by distributing the control of data, opposing the currently reigning platform logic              
which seeks to centralize control, consequently, a tug-of-war of control emerges between the two              
logics. This dichotomy is reviewed through a case study with an abductive approach in the context of                 
a financial institute owned by municipalities where our purpose is to answer what blockchain structure               
that should be deployed to support a cooperative lending platform. Our findings show that a               
blockchain consortium is the most supportive structure to apply in this type of platform. Our               
theoretical exploration of the private, public and consortium blockchain types aims to contribute to the               
blockchain literature. Consequently, as our findings explore business impacts of a financial institution             
they can be operationalized by cooperative organizations. 
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3 
Introduction 
Background  
The average lifespan of companies listed on the Standard & Poor 500 index has decreased from 67                 
years in the 1920’s to merely 15 years in 2012 indicating that new market conditions force businesses                 
to reassess their business models (Gittleson, 2012). Anthony, et al. (2018) argue that the ‘unicorn               
phenomena’, firms such as Uber or Airbnb, will continue to disrupt industries and thus accelerate               
creative destruction. ​However, most organizations are poorly prepared for this transition and therefore             
struggle with adapting their business models to these new market rules (Magnusson, 2017).             
Aforementioned firms in their respective industries, transport and lodgings, have questioned the role             
of incumbents by applying the platform logic (Anthony et al., 2018; Kenney & Zysman, 2016).               
Furthermore, since 2015, a large number of the most valuable companies by market capitalization has               
been platform owners, amongst these are Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook, thereby             
further confirming the prevalence of the platform logic (Zhu & Furr, 2016). In the platform economy,                
the platform owner becomes the locus of the value chain by acting as an intermediary, orchestrating                
multiple business actors and resources rather than producing and refining resources as in the              
traditional pipeline business (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). This severe concentration of power to one              
focal actor puts high demands on trust from affiliated partners, expecting that the platform is managed                
in an adequately balanced way to comply with the interests of the platform and its stakeholders                
(​Parker & Alstyne, 2014)​. Trust is a central part of the longevity of a platform, without a sophisticated                  
mechanism to build consensus, no trust can be established between the parties, or the platform owner                
(Botsman, 2017).  
 
In the wake of the 2008 global economic downturn, the trust for financial institutions hit a new                 
all-time low. Further, due to the revelations of mass-surveillance by Edward Snowden in 2013, and               
the subsequent leaks affiliated to political actors, secret services, and internet corporations, trust to              
governmental institutions has also decreased (Radu, 2015). This year, the CEO of Facebook was              
summoned to the US congress due to misconduct of the platform users’ data. Consequently, this               
severely damaged the trust of the platform owner with a reported decline of trust from users by 66%                  
and other reports say only 15% of consumers are confident that Facebook keeps their data secure                
(Rolfe, 2018; Weisbaum, 2018). Botsman (2017) argue that digital business models that facilitate peer              
to peer transactions, thus enabling trade between strangers, such as eBay, Airbnb and Uber constitute               
a new paradigm of networks based on trust, empowering the end-user, where the reputation capital               
these networks generate will redefine wealth, power relations, markets, and integrity.  
 
One technologic innovation that is argued to be able to reconfigure our systems of trust is Blockchain,                 
a distributed database or ledger that is cryptographically warranted, transactionally immutable and            
transparent (Morabito, 2017; Radu, 2015; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). One of the key principles to               
this technology is eliminating the middleman, one example is Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency based              
on blockchain, that renders central institutions such as banks obsolete (Radu, 2015). This is possible               
as the trust mechanism necessitated to conduct trade is embedded within the technology itself,              
achieved through cryptographic algorithms that ensure consensus between the nodes in the distributed             
database by continuously validating transactions (Ibid). Swan (2015) argue that blockchain, a public             
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ledger, has potential to become a globally distributed record for all assets, financial, property,              
software, health data or votes to name some. Morabito (2017) means that these properties have               
potential to save $20 billion through eliminating trust agencies that today are heavily centralized,              
motivating the investment potential in blockchain. The decentralized nature of blockchain is likely to              
have a significant impact on the digital economy due to its potential to ensure trust without relying on                  
heavily centralized and proprietary platforms, which today is the paradigm of e-commerce and             
governmental institutions (Collomb & Sok, 2016). Decentralized platforms such as Uber, that are             
enabling P2P interaction at the expense of a centralized transaction model and trust function seem               
disparate to blockchain and its distributed nature. Thus, blockchain could pose a serious threat to such                
a model, conversely, due to its distributed nature, it could enhance value sharing between peers even                
further; ​uberizing uber ​(Collomb & Sok, 2016)​. Henceforth, we argue that this technology poses a               
threat to incumbent platforms featured by great levels of centralization drawing attention to how              
blockchain should be governed.  
 
According to Xu et al. (2017), blockchains can be governed in three primary types​; public blockchains                
are permissionless and democratic ensuring solid verity of data and is useful in adversarial contexts,               
private blockchains which are cost-efficient and flexible avoiding the inertia decision-making of large             
communities and finally consortium blockchains (a hybrid) which stands somewhere in the middle but              
delimiting control and insight to the group of actors involved in the network. Each has different                
decentralization properties and can moreover substantially limit or facilitate business value making            
the choice of blockchain type an important consideration. Despite clarifying the characteristics of             
blockchain, being decentralized, the nature of blockchain and how it can be applied and configured to                
bring value in a business context is nebulous and yet to be explored to bring about insight to its                   
feasibility. Similarly, Kenney & Zysman (2016) argue that the nature of a platform itself is               
ambiguous, it is not clear if platforms are enablers of peer-to-peer value exchange, or simply a                
centralizer of control and interposer of a digital intermediary. Lindman, Rossi & Tuunainen (2017)              
call for further research to clarify the practical applicability of the blockchain technology in relation to                
platforms of financial exchange and motivates IS studies on open platforms as highly useful in order                
to crystalize possible governance options. Thereby, we argue that it is highly relevant to study the                
spectrum of centralization vs decentralization, balancing the properties of blockchain and platform            
logic to identify their convergence and potential synergies. Further Normark (1996) argues that             
cooperative organizations are important tools for counteracting monopsonies and monopolies and           
defines a cooperative as a business that is owned by one or several categories of users. This presents a                   
fruitful context for evaluating the balance between how such structure would fit between the dynamic               
of blockchain and platform logic, and how blockchain should be governed in such context.  
 
Purpose and research question 
The focus of this study is to examine what blockchain structure that would support the governance 
conditions of a lending platform in a cooperative context, thus the following research question aims to 
guide this study: 
 
What blockchain type supports a cooperative lending platform? 
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Limitation 
For the scope of this study, we have chosen to focus on governance structures or types of blockchain. 
There are many elements that make up distributed ledger technology or blockchain where consensus 
mechanisms and the deeper nature of cryptography are some, yet, our focal point of research is 
applied IT, therefore diminishing the relevance to study the technical depth of this data scientific 
topic. Thereby, we have chosen to exclude this from this study. 
The concept of blockchain  
Merriam-Webster defines blockchain as a database containing information, that can simultaneously           
distribute data to an ​open ​network (Blockchain, 2018). Similarly, Crosby et al. (2015) define a               
blockchain by essentially being a distributed database for records or a public ledger of all transactions                
conducted between participating parties. Moreover, Yli-Huumo (2016) argues that blockchain is a            
technology for decentralized transactions and data management. He further means that the main             
interest of this technology is due to these central attributes gained from the distributed data mechanics,                
such as anonymity, security, and data integrity without any third party organization in control of the                
transactions. 
 
Blockchain, or distributed ledger technology (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017) is a technology that was              
created as a technique to enable peer-to-peer transactions without the need of a middleman or               
validator i.e. banks (Radu, 2015; Yli-Huumo, 2016; Nakamoto, 2008). Blockchain is a decentralized             
and secure network that is generally characterized as open, inclusive and immutable (Tapscott &              
Tapscott, 2017). Blockchain also sustains equal rights by granting participants equal ability to access              
the network, further it also ensures data integrity through the utilization of cryptographic tools              
confirming the verity of transactions (Xu et al., 2017). Iansiti & Lakhani (2017) have summarized the                
core properties of blockchain into five basic principles that underlie the technology.  
 
First, it is founded on the concept of a distributed transactional database where computers constitute               
several nodes, this distinguishes blockchain from traditional, centralized networks where servers and            
variables are stored on one single computer (Morabito, 2017). Distinctive for centralized networks is              
that other systems in need of computational power have to connect to a single point i.e. computer                 
system. This grants control in regards to concentrated governance but conversely lacks transparency             
and democratic properties. Further, by distributing the nodes of the network, security issues related to               
one focal point of hardware is averted. Hacking a distributed database would require breaching a               
majority of the nodes in the network in order to gain access to be able to alter data.  
Second, blockchain enables peer-to-peer transmission meaning that data exchange occurs between           
peers unlike central networks necessitating a central node. Further, Radu (2015) argues that this logic               
differs from traditional centralized technologies by facilitating a democratized and shared           
infrastructural logic, which in turn has the potential to reduce the need of trusting otherwise               
designated institutions to administer records (Botsman, 2017). Third, transparency with pseudonymity           
means that all transactions conducted are visible to all actors granted access to the network. All nodes                 
in the network have unique addresses constituted of 30-plus alphanumeric characters which are             
public, however, anonymity is enabled through that the owner of a node is optional to reveal (Iansiti &                  
Lakhani, 2017).  
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Fourth, irreversibility of records or immutability means that all transactions conducted in the network              
are permanently stored and unable to be altered since they are linked together with every previous                
block forming the blockchain (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). Through various cryptographic           
algorithms, the validity of the records on the database can be ensured chronologically and warrant               
their unity (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017).  
Fifth, computational logic allows for advanced programmability to be executed and automate            
transactions between nodes in a way that is inoperable in contemporary systems such as the               
centralized banking ledgers which is part of why Iansiti & Lakhani (2017) argues that the need for                 
intermediaries like lawyers, banks or brokers are disputed. 
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Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework is distributed in two themes. The first theme illuminates studies and              
research important to take into account in order to understand the concept of blockchain technology.               
The essential characteristics of blockchain are presented whereupon we further elaborate possible            
governance structures. ​We argue that there is value in studying governance structures or blockchain              
type ​further to enrich the understanding of how blockchain can be applied in environments with               
complex stakeholder relations. This is to understand the effects such disintermediating technology can             
bring to power relations and its impact on the business model it is meant to support. To further nuance                   
this understanding we have complemented blockchain type theory with a second theoretical theme,             
platform logic, due to their contrasting yet converging nature. We draw upon extant research and shed                
light on how platform logics change market structures and forces that alter power dynamics rendering               
the platform a centralized entity. To clarify the intersection between blockchain type and platform              
logic, platform governance regarding the degree of openness is reviewed.  
 
The nature of trust within the context of blockchain can be separated into actor and action. Validation                 
of an actor is established in the type or permission of participation in a blockchain which we will                  
review in more detail in this theory section. Further, validation of an action, the validity of                
transactions, on a blockchain is determined by a so-called consensus mechanism. However, the matter              
of consensus mechanisms is delimited from this study where instead permission of participation,             
referred to as type, is the focal point of this study of blockchain.  
Blockchain governance types 
Blockchain, a distribution solution that annihilates the need of any third party organization in the               
middle. Every transaction ever completed in a blockchain is shared and available to all the nodes                
(Yli-Huumo, 2016). In order to set a governance structure for a blockchain there are conditions that                
require careful consideration. Depending on the purpose of a blockchain network, different conditions             
will apply when determining rules of participation. The two fundamental poles governing the             
distribution of authority, i.e. level of centralization, of the so-called ​type ​can be divided into               
permissioned and permission-less (Xu et al., 2017). Permissioned blockchains utilize one or more             
‘gatekeepers’ for users’ participation whereas permission-less are completely open: new users can join             
the network at any given time, generally governed by a validation scheme to ensure stability and trust                 
(Morabito, 2017). Permissioned blockchains may be more suitable for regulated industries, on the             
other hand, permission-less are generally considered more resilient to hostile intentions. There are             
many trade-offs between permissioned and permissionless blockchains including costs, transaction          
processing 
rate, reversibility, censorship-resistance, finality, modularity and optimizing the network rules. 
Public Blockchain 
The first blockchain network to be introduced was bitcoin in 2008. This blockchain was public in                
nature and introduced the concept of electronic peer-to-peer transactions without the need of an              
otherwise centralized authority validating data exchange (Nakamoto, 2008). A public blockchain is a             
permissionless network allowing anyone access needless of an authority granting participation           
regarding both rights to write and read from the blockchain. Instead, validation of participants is a                
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continuous process driven by comparing that the nodes (actors) of the network contains the same data,                
thereby assuring consensus in the blockchain (Xu et al., 2017). Despite this process being prevalent in                
all blockchains, this process becomes critical in a public chain since the absence of an authority                
regulating access potentially allows for corrupted actors in the network. Xu et al. (2017) argue that by                 
distributing authentication of transactions, the public blockchain achieves the strongest integrity since            
the cryptographic mechanism becomes the strongest in a vastly distributed network. This is carried out               
through monetized incentives incorporated in cryptoeconomics such as Bitcoin, Ethereum or Litecoin,            
transactions inconsistent with the blockchain can be ruled out thus eliminating the risk of              
disproportionate influence in the network. This is considered to ensure long-term stability and the              
trustless principle of continuous validation through cryptoeconomics is also what attributes a            
blockchain to be deemed as completely decentralized (Buterin, 2015). Further, Xu et al. (2017) mean               
that public blockchains support unrestricted data transparency and therefore auditability but on the             
expense of cost efficiency since the network can consist of a huge number of nodes, all required to                  
sign the transactions which further decelerates transaction speed. 
Private Blockchain 
Unlike public blockchains where participants are neither necessarily known or trusted, in private             
blockchains the participants are selected through already pre-established trust. Private blockchain           
networks delimit governance and development to one single organization, however this organization            
can consist of multiple divisions constituting the nodes of the network (Xu et al., 2017). This single                 
point of authority is the only actor allowed to write in the chain, yet reading the data depends on the                    
choice of governance and may be either private or publicly accessible (Buterin, 2015; Morabito,              
2017). Further, Xu et al. (2017) argue the performance of a private blockchain is higher than in a                  
public. This is because the time required to finalize each subsequent block to the chain is reduced due                  
to less rigorous authentication requirements with pre-established trust. Further, by only having one             
organization governing the network, high configurational flexibility is acquired, however, this is            
somewhat proportionally relative to a decline in the democratic properties of a public blockchain.              
Opposed to a public blockchain constituting unconditional data access, a private chain ensures privacy              
allowing its owner to be selective in transparency (Xu et al., 2017). Private blockchains seem to fit                 
well with corporations in need of control and integrity for sensitive data such as business strategies or                 
financial information that would be inappropriate to expose to business competitors (Morabito, 2017).             
However, there may exist a reason for public readability for auditing agencies and governmental              
institutions.  
Consortium Blockchain 
A Consortium blockchain is a permissioned network applied by multiple organizations, where each             
organization operates a node, the majority of nodes has to sign each block in order for it to become                   
valid (Xu et al., 2017). A consortium blockchain is a hybrid between a public blockchain and a                 
private, where, it has never a single point of authority as a private, nor is it a fully decentralized                   
blockchain as a public (Buterin, 2015). Xu et al. (2017) mean that in order to authorize the                 
participants of the network, permissioned blockchains require a permission management component.           
This component and the fact that the consortium consists of an agreed set of members means that it                  
becomes far more flexible and transformable in comparison to a permissionless public chain where              
inertia will arise due to the more comprising democratic processes. The consortium type is beneficial               
to apply where the integrity of data is sensitive and thus unsuitable for public insight, inherent to a                  
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public chain, and therefore requires actors to be selected through pre-established trust, as in a private                
chain. However, due to multiple actors, adversarial interests might exist such as in a business               
consortium and thus necessitating the distribution of control from a central point (Xu et al., 2017).                
Buterin (2015) means that a blockchain consortium can be distributed amongst a number of selected               
organizations but at the same time offers the opportunity to enable access to read the blockchain to the                  
public meaning that it can allow public insight whilst maintaining decision making to the consortium.               
The spectra between private and public is wide and still to a great extent undefined as the technology                  
is still developing, no matter the type of blockchain, it comes with advantages and disadvantages,               
there is no true way of ​blockchaining ​(Buterin, 2015; Lin, 2017). Below, we have made an effort to                  
solidify the consensus of the types and their benefits.  
 
The table presented below is inspired by Xu et al. (2017) and discriminates the conditions for the three 
blockchain types and aims to conceptualize the elementary properties of blockchain. X represents how 
well each property is accommodated in each type. Trust is generated from the cryptographic 
interaction between the nodes meaning that the blockchain network itself can be trusted instead of 
relying on an intermediary actor, thus the greater the network the more stable and more trust can be 
bestowed this mechanism. However, conversely, the decision to establish a permissioned blockchain 
necessitates pre-established levels of trust since the relationship between the involved actors becomes 
more directly interdependent. Transparency refers to the readability to the blockchain, the less 
permissioned the more transparent. The integrity of data is ensured through cryptographic tools 
confirming the verity of transactions. Equal rights concern participation and based on its level of 
openness it can be more or less democratic, however, it provides the same rights to alter the 
blockchain for all of its nodes. Cost efficiency is defined as the cost of operation and computation in 
the blockchain. Flexibility concerns how agile the blockchain is in regards to changes in its 
governance.  
 
 
Figure 1. Review of the elementary properties of the three blockchain types. 
Platforms  
Platform logic changes market conditions and the coordination of economic activity from traditional             
“pipeline” business featured by the classic value chain model presented by Michael Porter (1985)              
(Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). Pipeline business is constituted by a process where an input of                
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resources undertakes a number of activities in the value chain where it is incrementally refined and                
channeled into an output which is the product of the chain. The internet changed these dynamics and                 
lead to a restructuring of the market forces such as decreasing the barriers of entry, enforcing the                 
bargaining power of buyers and provided suppliers greater access to customers (Porter, 2001). Kenney              
& Zysman (2016) argues that the emergence of the platform logic further changed the market rules,                
disrupting incumbent businesses by centralizing power to the intermediary and thus resetting entry             
barriers and regulatory conditions making the dependence of the platform ​ubiquitous ​(Edelman,            
2014). Whilst asserted to be ubiquitous, Kenney & Zysman (2016) argue that the role of a platform is                  
concurrently ambiguous ​i.e. it is not clear if platforms interpose a digital intermediary or a catalyst of                 
peer-to-peer value exchange, and how we attribute the platform matters as it serves as a stepping stone                 
for interpretation, usage, and regulation.  
 
Platforms are diverse, both in function and in structure (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). According to               
Boudreau (2010), a platform could include physical components, rules and tools to facilitate             
development, and technological standards to support interoperability. Operating as a nexus, a platform             
can organize the constant interchangeability of technological development and its complementary           
components. Parker & Alstyne (2014) argues that platforms provide building blocks that construct the              
foundation for products and services. Further, Ahmed (2018) argues that a platform also acts as an                
enabler of business models and facilitator of value exchange.  
 
Platforms expand and/or disrupt business models (Kenney & Zysman, 2016; Ahmed, 2018). By being              
the enabler of new models and practices, Boudreau (2010) argues that inherently this implies that               
platforms also act as the bottlenecks for organizations. Thereby, the governance of one is paramount               
to understand the dynamics of platform logic (Boudreau, 2010). The platform owner possesses             
“bouncer´s rights”; the ability to exclude any outsiders unfit to be an actor in the system. Inherently,                 
the platform owner dictates the restrictions of the platforms’ usage, development and            
commercialization, likewi​se, gains the inverse ability: to open or remove any restrictions (Boudreau,             
2010). The level of openness can significantly affect participation and motivation of investment from              
platform partners (Parker & Alstyne, 2014). This will be further elaborated​ in the following section. 
Platform governance (degree of openness) 
One central question for platforms is that of adequately balanced control designed to ​accommodate              
involved stakeholders and maximize the value proposition of the platform (Boudreau, 2010). The             
degree of openness concerns patency of intellectual property and the inclusion of external actors to the                
platform owners systems (Parker & Alstyne, 2014). Being an intermediary, platforms, two- or             
multi-sided markets often host a variety of actors whose utilities are dependent on each other for a                 
balance in supply and demand. Parker & Alstyne (2014) emphasize that a well-orchestrated interplay              
is paramount since failing to balance buyers and sellers for an auction or mismatching game               
developers and gamers will make the intrinsic value of the platform insufficient to drive adoption.               
Two forces being present here are ​adoption​, which is the drive for opening for participation and                
attraction of users to expose the platform to the market and ​appropriation ​which aims to regulate and                 
capture the value generated on the platform in order for the owners to capitalize upon (Parker &                 
Alstyne, 2014).  
 
Opening enables swift adoption of users generating momentum for the platform required to claim              
market presence (Boudreau, 2010). Cusumano (2010) argues that in order to becom​e an industrywide              
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platform, companies must, through their strategy, financially incentivize complementors, which can           
be done by subsidizing or having low or no fees to join. Fostering openness can facilitate rapid                 
content growth which is a strong tool for building platform dominance (Cennamo & Santaló, 2015).               
Further, high levels of openness stimulate innovation by allowing third parties to create novel content               
on the platform due to modest conditions further empowering the platforms value proposition. ​Parker              
& Alstyne (2014) argue that third party complementors have more successful initial public offerings              
and greater negotiating influence to prevent their value from exploitation if they are provided stronger               
intellectual property rights by the platform owner​. ​Conversely, if unilateral conditions are perceived             
suggesting appropriation by the platform owner, third parties can be deterred from sharing their value               
or from committing to the platform which can weaken the value proposition of the platform (Parker &                 
Alstyne, 2014).  
 
A different strategy is to regulate the quality of the content and aim to offer state of the art content that                     
is exclusive to the platform (Cennamo & Santaló, 2015). This regulation relates to the problem of                
multi-homing which demands third parties to delimit their content to the platform to make it exclusive                
i.e. single-home. Less conditioned platforms abstain from such coercion and allow third parties to              
offer their content on competing platforms i.e. multi-home, however, research shows that this strategy              
decreases the revenue of the platform (Parker & Alstyne, 2014).  
 
Cennamo & Santaló (2015) emphasize that a combination of these strategies, facilitating rapid content              
growth through modest regulation conjoint with offering exclusive state of the art content might be               
appealing as a concept but is problematic in reality. This is because it evokes unfocused growth                
including both the issue of enrolling many comparable content providers offering the same value              
which can render a price war and fu​rthermore due to brand diminishing where the capability to                
differentiate becomes undermined (Cennamo & Santaló, 2015). Additionally, if the platform is to be              
devised from a currently existing product, this presupposes a great or defensible original product since               
a platform itself is no care package for a struggling product (Zhu & Furr, 2016).  
 
Aforementioned phenomena constitute the poles in the platform tug-of-war between adoption, 
necessitating openness in order to gain a critical mass of users (Zhu & Furr, 2016) and appropriation, 
addressing the capability to absorb value facilitated and brought to the platform by complementors 
(Kenney & Zysman, 2016; Parker & Alstyne, 2014). The platform concepts presented in this section 
are meant to complement the evaluation of the different blockchain types and how their applicability 
will necessitate a more pipeline-oriented or more platform-oriented business model.  
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Methodology 
Research approach 
Based on the type of the study, the research question and the theoretical background, we have chosen                 
to conduct an abductive approach as it provides the opportunity of iteration consequently, support a               
more in-depth analysis (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008; Dubois & Gadde, 2002). We have alternated              
between the theoretical and empirical data, which has helped us to interpret the material, find new                
patterns, and gain a deeper understanding. This process is called ​systematic combination ​(Dubois &              
Gadde, 2002). 
 
The study is based on a qualitative research effort where the aim has been to create a holistic overview                   
of how the focal business and its member companies could use a blockchain platform to leverage                
business value. To review this, we have conducted a single case study with a holistic approach.                
According to Merriam (2009) case studies are beneficial to genuine and thorough results of a current                
situation. Moreover, Yin (2014) argues that a single case study allows the researcher to question old                
theoretical relationships and explore new ones, further the single case study has synergies of the               
juxtapositioning nature of an abductive approach. A holistic approach is considered highly beneficial             
to answer ​how​, ​what​, or ​why questions. As we aim to provide genuine and thorough results, we                 
applied our theoretical model to a specific organizational structure (cooperative), to answer a “What”              
research question, we argue that a single case study with a holistic approach is the most beneficial for                  
our research. 
 
We have solidified our theoretical framework, abstracted the essence aligned with our research             
question and subsequently formulated two interview frameworks, one for each side of the cooperative,              
this will be elaborated further on in the section below called “selection”. This procedure of               
constructing interview questions based on the theoretical framework is known as operationalization,            
and enhances the relevance of the data and generally supports the alignment of a research question(s)                
(Patel & Davidson, 2011). 
Selection 
We have made a targeted selection, described by Bryman (2011) as a strategic selection, where our                
starting point has been to identify an actor within the financial industry that is exploring potential                
business areas with blockchain technology. Aiming towards actors within finance is motivated by that              
the sector has the most blockchain applications to date and would thus more likely than other                
industries offer an organization suitable to our study of blockchain governance. Our intention was to               
conduct a study of a cooperative organization as it is deemed to be an equilibrium in between                 
centralized platform logic and the decentralized blockchain technology. On the individual level of             
informants, we strived to identify key positions in the organization in question of various competence               
areas since they would have the most insight and influence on the business and the organization                
suitable to answer questions regarding power relations and integrity of proprietary data. When             
identifying the informants we applied what Bryman, (2011) refers to as snowball sampling meaning              
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that each informant was able to personally recommend us further informants deemed suitable, in order               
to find the most useful informants. 
Research context 
This thesis constitutes decision support in the project “blockchain-based provisioning of financial            
marketplace services” hosted by blockchain lab at the department of applied IT at the University of                
Gothenburg. The project discovered that the Swedish local government funding agency called            
Kommuninvest (KI) were exploring whether blockchain technology would be feasible in their            
organization. KI is a cooperative organization where the members and customers are swedish             
municipalities which together constitute an economic association that owns the company. The            
business model of KI is based on providing low-cost financing for municipalities, they are however               
exploring whether blockchain can be used to build a platform where KI becomes more of a                
matchmaker. The organization Kommuninvest aligns well with the scope of this thesis due to their               
structure and ambitions, thus many synergies were gained by the participation in the project, and the                
organization was a great source of data collection in the process of answering our research question.  
Data collection  
The empirical evidence that has been the basis for this study has been collected through workshops 
and interviews. The workshops have been designed to guide the direction of the project and reveal key 
positions within the organization in order to identify what perspectives and topics to be reviewed in 
the interviews.  
Workshops 
Three workshops were conducted intended to establish a deep understanding of the organization in              
order to identify adequate informants and ensure a qualitative data gathering. The first workshop was               
structured to enhance our ability to gauge the different stakeholders and how to accommodate their               
perspectives, and thus crystallising the cooperative company structure. The project group expressed            
potential business applications and related requirements and limitations. The second workshop was            
used to further introduce the project group to blockchain technology in order for them to closer assess                 
its properties where an associate senior lecturer from the department of applied IT of the University of                 
Gothenburg demonstrated the basics of cryptographic features and how blockchain could be applied in              
a supply chain. We also used this session to review which key persons within the company we could                  
interview in private sessions for a deeper understanding of the organizational conditions of how a               
blockchain based platform could be governed. At the time of the third workshop we had conducted the                 
individual interviews and chose to control our empirical findings with the project group in order to                
confirm that we have made correct assumptions and to ensure that we had covered the relevant                
perspectives on the case, consequently confirming the validity of our data. 
  
Repstad (1999) argues that allowing the informant to think about and reflect on their answers ensures                
purposeful answers whereby we encouraged the members of the project group to express personal              
opinions to give them room for personal reflections. We have continuously conducted analyses of              
collected data to get a picture of which aspects of the problem area we needed to complement as Patel                   
& Davidsson (2011) illuminate this as an approach to incrementally improve the interview templates.              
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This knowledge has then iteratively been used to improve the two variants of interview templates for                
subsequent interviews (Repstad, 1999). 
 
 
Workshops 
Workshop #1 Duration 4h Date 2018-03-19 
organization Participants 
Kommuninvest Business developer 
 Client manager 
 Research and education manager 
 Chief analyst 
External consultant Interaction designer 
University of Gothenburg Associate senior lecturer 
Large municipality #2 Chief financial officer (CFO) 
Workshop #2 Duration 6h Date 2018-04-17 
organization Participants 
Kommuninvest Business developer 
 Research and education manager 
 Chief analyst 
External consultant Interaction designer 
University of Gothenburg Associate senior lecturer 
Large municipality #2 Chief financial officer (CFO) 
Workshop #3 Duration 4h Date 2018-05-08 
organization Participants 
Kommuninvest Business developer 
 Client manager 
 Chief analyst 
External consultant Interaction designer 
University of Gothenburg Associate senior lecturer 
Large municipality #2 Chief financial officer (CFO) 
Figure 2. Workshops 
Interviews  
We have used a qualitative semi-structured approach to construct our interview questions (see             
appendix I & II) where the questions were designed in alignment with Trost´s (2010) interpretation of                
a qualitative semi-structured interview, i.e asking primarily open questions to be comprehensible            
without requiring profound technical insight, thereby allowing the respondents to talk broadly about             
the subject. If the respondents deemed a question too broad, unclear, or off-topic, more specific               
follow-up questions were asked to clarify and obtain relevant data. Moreover, once an especially              
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relevant and/or insightful piece of information arose, more follow-up questions were asked to obtain              
an in-depth perspective of the context in question. The individual interviews were eight in total, where                
five were internal positions at Kommuninvest and three from the municipalities. To facilitate the              
different stakeholders’ perspectives we chose to include three municipalities of varying size and             
geographic location, the informants were composed as presented in the tables below. 
 
Individual interviews 
organization Role Time Date Format 
Kommuninvest Chief information officer (CIO) 1h 2018-04-18 Personal meeting 
 
Chief operations officer (COO) & Vice 
president (VP) 1h 2018-04-18 Personal meeting 
 Head of business development 1h 2018-04-18 Phone 
 Senior portfolio manager 1h 2018-04-18 Personal meeting 
 Chief analyst 1h 2018-04-18 Personal meeting 
Large 
municipality 
#1 Treasury manager 1h 2018-04-19 Phone 
Medium 
municipality Financial manager 1h 2018-04-20 Phone 
Large 
municipality 
#2 Chief financial officer (CFO) 1h 2018-04-23 Personal meeting 
Figure 3. Individual interviews 
Analysis  
After we transcribed the interviews, we processed the transcripts and performed a data analysis in               
accordance with Braun & Clarke´s (2006) thematic analysis. During this process, we identified             
recurring patterns in the data that were categorized under six prominent themes adopted from Xu et al.                 
(2017). The themes were: ​trust, transparency, integrity, equal rights,​ ​cost efficiency, ​and ​flexibility​. 
 
We have chosen to create categories for the data in advance in order to prevent our own thoughts and                   
opinions affecting the results. This approach allowed us to evaluate the results of our data collection in                 
a clear way, with the starting point of creating a solid foundation based on the data we acquired with                   
the objective of answering our research question. The process of categorizing the collected data was               
inspired by Sharp, Rogers, and Preece (2011) who highlights the value of two persons working               
simultaneously to determine that the result reflects the data and that both persons analyzed the data                
concordantly. 
Validity 
Yin states (2014) that it is of utmost import to establish high validity throughout any research process                 
as the data gathered could greatly affect the information output of the study. We have used the same                  
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interview framework for each part of the cooperative, i.e. one for Kommuninvest and one for the                
municipalities, further the interview frameworks can be found in the appendix (I & II).  
 
During a qualitative interview study, there is a risk that the interviewer will affect the informant and                 
color his or her answers through body language, facial expressions or similar behavior (Sharp, Rogers               
& Preece, 2011). This is primarily a risk that occurs in personal contact, where we have had this in                   
mind in order to remain objective and neutral towards the informants. The qualitative interviews we               
conducted have also provided room for clarification, if an answer to a question has been unclear, we                 
have had the opportunity to receive feedback from the informant at a later stage to request                
clarification of any answers such as remained unclear, which positively affected the validity of the               
data. 
 
Patel & Davidson (2011) argues that utilizing different methods of data collection can increase              
validity, whereby we have aimed to ensure this by collecting data from both personal interviews and                
through workshops. The data analysis was carried out through individual thematization whereby it             
could be determined that the results reflected the data and that both researchers of this study had                 
analyzed the data concordantly. Finally, once the data was collected and thematized, the result was               
presented during a third workshop and verified that it had been correctly interpreted, thereby              
increasing our validity further.  
The research process 
The research process was initiated with the formation of a theoretical framework draft. Drawing from               
existing theories, the research question was formulated. Subsequently, the research question and the             
theoretical framework served as foundations for the interview questions and the data gathering.  
 
During the period of solidifying the theoretical framework, one workshop was conducted to align the               
theory better with the context. Once that sufficient theoretical material was gathered and aligned with               
the research context, a second workshop was conducted followed by individual interviews.            
Subsequently, the findings were structured in accordance with relevant themes and presented during a              
third workshop to receive feedback and increase the validity of our empirical data. 
 
The analysis was developed by constant comparison of the theoretical framework and the empirical              
findings, ultimately presenting the most insightful and relevant findings in accordance with the             
research question. The essence of the discussion revealed a clear conclusion which answered our              
research question. Throughout the process, we have received guidance from our supervisor, as well as               
constructive criticism from other members of the IT-faculty at the University of Gothenburg. 
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Results 
Throughout this section, the results of the interviews are presented. The chapters are based on the 
thematization from the data collection entailing the six themes; ​trust, transparency, integrity, equal 
rights, cost efficiency and​ ​flexibility​. The first five themes correspond to the elementary properties of 
blockchain whereas the sixth and final theme identifies concepts from platform governance. In 
concert, the insights and standpoints of the respondents reveal how the different blockchain types 
would be applicable to a cooperative lending platform. 
Trust 
The topic of trust was discussed by the respondents and there was a consensus that high levels of trust                   
were permeating the organization, however, a perspective that affect trust in practice surfaced from              
the financial manager regarding the alignment between KI’s agenda and that of the cooperative. The               
chief operations officer/vice president of kommuninvest (KI) describes the owner conditions of            
kommuninvest to be special since it is a cooperative enterprise owned by municipalities meaning that               
there are in principle no conflicting stakeholder relationships which allow the enterprise to             
substantially serve the interests of the public. She means that they as a financial institution have a                 
setup for great trust from the member municipalities since they, unlike a bank, do not have to produce                  
returns to shareholders nor generate return in various bonus programs. The chief analyst confirms this               
but points out that there are some inquiries regarding their pricing of loans. She further comments that                 
the municipalities do entrust kommuninvest but they, unfortunately, aren’t always completely           
discriminated from a bank in their eyes and that some additional trust could potentially be achieved                
through increased transparency of their pricing. This statement is confirmed by the financial manager              
of the medium municipality who currently utilizes a private consultancy to seek financial advisory              
despite that this service is actually offered by KI.  
 
“I would probably really have to grasp that they [KI] are an independent advisor and do not 
prioritize themselves. I have absolutely not seen any signs that they do not would be 
independent, but it is more that... I have never seen them as an advisor. To me, they are 
someone I'm asking for ... I want to borrow from them and want to know what conditions they 
have” ​Financial manager, medium municipality 
 
In order to gain trust from the municipalities when they operate a financial planning tool called KI                 
finance offered by KI to observe the finances of their members, the chief analyst addresses that access                 
to the user data is limited to only account managers and the research department and that the business                  
department is excluded from access. The CIO expresses that KI controls their members to a high                
degree which they aim to reduce in the future since it is out of their mission, rather KI should focus on                     
providing the best loan terms for municipalities, and entitling them to trust that they are professional                
enough to manage their own finances. 
 
“Today, we monitor very, very much [the prerequisites of making a loan], and our ambition is 
to decrease the level of control to a large extent because it is not our mission to do so. 
Instead, we should be able to trust when they [municipalities] request new a loan, that it is 
correct. […] In reality, our mission is only to lend as cheap as virtually possible.” - CIO  
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The head of business development and the senior portfolio manager further argues that KI has earned                
a substantial amount of trust, both from municipalities and investors, since the 2008 financial crisis,               
due to well-managed placements of funds. They argue that a high trust also corresponds in high                
creditworthiness, thereby providing municipalities even better loan terms. The treasury manager and            
the CFO of the large municipalities confirms a great relationship and perceives great transparency and               
values the simplicity in the services offered which is echoed by the financial manager of the                
medium-sized municipality asserting great confidence in KI. However, the financial manager points            
out that she would have to comprehend further that they are independent advisors and do not prioritize                 
themselves. Thus, the definition, and the level, of trust varies between the respondents, however even               
if the level of trust varies between the perspectives, collectively all respondents have confirmed that               
the level of trust is high within the cooperative. 
Transparency 
All the respondents have had a similar view that greater transparency generally benefits everyone,              
however, the financial manager of the medium-sized municipality expressed some doubts of the             
potential malevolence of external actors. The COO/VP argues that there is a strength in risk spreading                
which can be achieved through transparency and states that they intend to accomplish this through               
continuous insight from their board of directors. She believes that it would be beneficial if the data on                  
KI finance would be completely open but that it would require municipalities to be prepared to defend                 
their positions if put under the loupe by external actors. The COO means that they intend to increase                  
their transparency and that their vast market share of 50% and currently increasing, demands it when                
they are such a dominating actor.  
 
“It's quite simple. The more transparent you are, the clearer you are, the better the terms you 
will get simply, I think. That is the basic philosophy” Senior portfolio manager 
 
The senior portfolio manager means that the greater transparency the better investor relations and that               
everything that deviates from planned loans and drives prices up. The CIO argues that it would be                 
beneficial if the data from KI finance would become open which is agreed upon by the chief analyst                  
and senior portfolio manager stating that they currently in practice are forced to be transparent due to                 
the principle that everyone should be entitled access to public documents that are not confidential               
(offentlighetsprincipen). However the chief analyst refers to KI finance, their financial planning tool             
offered to municipalities, and means that since municipalities can enter loans from other issuers              
(banks) than KI, these would not appreciate an exposed pricing since it would allow KI to undercut                 
them. However, the CIO addresses that they should handle the data with respect meaning that they                
should track who has gained access to any financial records. The CFO of the large municipality argues                 
that none of the records on KI finance are secret and that transparency would not be a problem and the                    
treasury manager of the other large municipality means that it would be beneficial to be able to study                  
how other municipalities plan their debt management. The financial manager of the medium-sized             
municipality concurs with perceived value in access to other municipalities finances and means that it               
would allow them to question their margins. However, she expresses doubt regarding that external              
actors might potentially be able to use the records of the municipality owned companies in a strategic                 
purpose.  
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Integrity (immutability) 
The respondents have expressed a great enthusiasm in making the data immutable, however, the head               
of business development sees concerns as it could have undesired effects on the balance of trade                
power. The COO means that a permanent record history, the feature of immutability, would be               
beneficial since it would allow a greater traceability of decision making. The chief analyst mentions               
that this has value besides than strict monetary and means that immutability would simplify              
traceability of loans and various certificates such as green funding, funds that are considered socially               
and environmentally conscious, to be better validated. The CIO and senior portfolio manager are              
positive but the head of business development problematizes the feature in the case of a peer-to-peer                
platform where municipalities would be able to provide offers to investors and these would be               
permanently recorded.  
 
“...as Alingsås (a small municipality) announce a request to borrow and [...] when it's been 
13 days and then one day, if they have not received a single bid, ie no one wants to buy [trade 
with] Alingsås. What are they doing then? [...] the market will remember that the last time 
Alingsås tried to borrow money through the platform, no one answered. How does that affect 
Alingås leverage?” ​Head of business development  
 
He means that in the case of a municipality offering a price for an obligation or loan and no investors                    
would bid, this could potentially damage their price over time. The treasury manager of a large                
municipality and the financial manager of a medium municipality do not see any issues with               
permanent record history, conversely, the CFO of a large municipality sees that this could simplify               
auditing since they always request changelogs.  
 
“Could you lock such a system, then it would be worth gold, because then you could close 
those questions [access logs required for auditing]” ​CFO, large municipality. 
 
He expresses that it would solidify their security with rating institutes if it would be possible to 
guarantee that their financial records were immutable. 
Equal rights 
All of the respondents have demonstrated a willingness to participate in the developing of a               
blockchain based platform and that both parties of the cooperative (KI and municipalities), should be               
involved to some extent. Yet, the chief analyst, CIO, Treasury manager and CFO of the large                
municipalities express limitations of said involvement. The chief analyst means that if a blockchain              
platform is to replace the current loaning process it is important that the municipalities are involved in                 
the development of it in order to assure that they feel involved. However, she stresses that it is not                   
certain that the municipalities should be involved in the governance and maintenance of such              
platform. 
 
"I think they need to be very involved [in the development] [...] The governance issue is more 
difficult though. [...] What is best? Is it some technocrats who are sitting and doing their thing 
or is it the commonalty trying to compromise something?" ​Chief analyst at KI 
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The CIO argues that the municipalities should be involved somehow but since their board of directors                
already consist of the municipal councils it is sufficient to consult them, he further argues that it is not                   
certain that it is KI:s mission to be such an intermediary it would situate to host a blockchain platform.                   
He states that they currently are working to automate their loaning processes which is an initiative the                 
member municipalities have been involved in but clarifies that they are not granted governance rights               
regarding how the process should be carried out. The treasury manager of one of the large                
municipalities is positive to an involvement in the development given that they are provided clear               
demands and instructions unlike the financial manager of the medium municipality who is uncertain if               
their involvement in the development would be beneficial. The CFO of one of the large municipalities                
is convinced it would be inefficient to involve all of the municipalities and suggests that a                
composition of various sizes of municipalities should represent the overall requisites. 
Cost efficiency 
The COO/VP, chief analyst, and head of business development sees that the primary value of KI is the                  
benefits of economy of scale, however, the CFO and the treasury manager of large municipalities sees                
clear benefits of their relationship besides monetary. Yet, the head of business development highlights              
the potential of havoc in the financial industry if KI would change their focus and business model.  
The CFO of one of the large municipalities points out that the perceived value from KI has changed                  
over time, after various collaborative projects and through the development of the financial tool KI               
finance they are very positive to these returns that are beyond strictly monetary. Additional value               
desired from the treasury manager of a large municipality is the possibility to exchange knowledge               
and insights regarding municipal debt management. The COO/VP means that a primary value of KI:s               
business model is built on economies of scale where borrowing of significant size generates              
possibilities to offer non-volatile pricing over time. However, the head of business development points              
out this feature has gradually diminished due to market regulations allowing more swift access to               
funding meaning that their own financial reserves are being downsized. The chief analyst argues that               
the economies of scale benefits are valuable to a certain limit and means that a blockchain platform                 
allowing municipalities direct access to investors could be a complement and not a substitute for their                
current business model. The head of business development emphasizes that this would eat into the               
profitability of the market makers, the banks who acts matchmaker between investors and borrower,              
with consequences. He argues that this would reduce their incentives of facilitating this process              
meaning that another actor would have to take this over, something the business developer questions               
whether KI would be able to host themselves. Further, the head of business development means that if                 
the market makers abstain from facilitating a primary market nor will they likely host a secondary                
market, which is where bonds are exchanged after initially being sold thus inhibiting fluent trading               
which he means could hurt terms and conditions for municipalities.  
 
The senior portfolio manager points out that the Swedish investment collective is small and strictly               
homogenous meaning that their agendas and actions are aligned, unfortunately rendering them great             
power to influence conditions and pricing for borrowers. However, even if the head of business               
development points out that they most often counteract innovation and likely would intend to thwart               
such initiative, both he and the senior portfolio manager agrees that an endeavor to include them                
would be worth a try. If a blockchain-based peer-to-peer platform allowing municipalities to interact              
directly with investors both the head of business development and senior portfolio manager argues              
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that a standardising of possible trade would be necessitated. They mean that a peer-to-peer situation               
would lead to a great fragmenting of offers and bids rendering great volatility which would be                
undesired from investors leading to unfavourable borrowing terms. In order to regulate this, a              
standardized set of conditions for borrowing would be required. The possibility to standardize such              
platform is partly dependant on how corresponding processes currently work according to the chief              
analyst who points out that the processes for the account managers, handling borrowing requests, is               
highly ambiguous and independently established inhibiting a shared benchmark. 
 
Flexibility 
The COO/VP and CIO, as well as the CFO and treasury manager of the large municipalities are all                  
positive to the situation where KI would become less of an intermediary through a blockchain               
platform. However, the financial manager, senior portfolio manager and the head of business             
development points out challenges such transformation would generate.  
KI is a member-owned enterprise where the parent company consists of an economic association with               
the municipal councils as the board of directors. The company also has a smaller board of directors for                  
the company to handle the operative business. The personnel managing the interaction with KI              
regarding finances and borrowing from each municipality is however handled by public servants             
which creates a dynamic power relation. The COO/VP means that this sometimes surfaces when the               
public servants from the municipalities have expectations and requests that are conflicting the             
directives of their directors regarding how their finances should be carried out, sometimes meaning              
that KIs account managers have to contest their requests. The COO/VP points out that despite them                
working closely founded on their owner directives, they also have to be able to make business                
decisions generating value to the members without them asking for it. The chief analyst mentions that,                
if need be, they have to intervene when an unhealthy debt growth is identified in the municipality,                 
which is a process necessitating a central governance structure. She further necessitates a central              
governance if they are supposed to be able to counteract a high price dissemination in borrowing                
terms in order to nurse the cooperatives best intentions. In contrast to central governance, the CIO                
presents that a goal has been set to automate the borrowing process to the year 2020 further arguing                  
that they have an ambition reduce their level of controlling how municipalities borrow. He means that                
if a blockchain-based platform that allows municipalities to borrow from either investors or other              
municipalities without KI:s intermediation, it has to be motivated with economic benefits for the              
municipalities and that if KI isn’t the one to host such platform he is doubtful that someone else will.                   
The COO/VP argues that one reason for allowing municipalities to borrow among themselves is              
because there exists a surplus of 20-30 billion SEK in the municipal sector which could be more                 
efficiently distributed. She further states that a previous attempt to solve this, where KI intended to                
channel the accounts of their municipalities into a national account failed when the bank, SEB,               
realized that this idea would eat into their business model whereupon they withdrew from the               
negotiation. When the COO/VP treats the topic of disintermediation she says that their existence is               
based on an added value and that if it turns out that there is a more pragmatic way to ensure efficient                     
borrowing for municipalities, that should lead the way. 
 
“If this technology [blockchain] really takes over all that [the current business model], then 
there is no value in Kommuninvest's survival, then the world has taken a step forward to 
finding something better.” ​COO/VP 
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This pragmatic view is echoed by the CIO claiming that if that if they are able to offer better financing                    
even if they disintermediate themselves, that automatically becomes their mission. However, the chief             
analyst points out that the current market conditions wouldn’t make it feasible for municipalities to               
borrow between themselves due to the negative interest rate, however, this is something that will               
change over time. The senior portfolio manager points out that the market makers, the banks that KI                 
borrows money from in their current structure, acts as a type of shock absorber meaning that they                 
acquire their liquidity over a long period of time in order to level out irregular market situations.                 
However, he argues that the market has unfortunately progressed towards a situation where less              
market making actually is taking place due to smaller reserves at the banks and this process has                 
become more of a mediating feature wiring funds from one place to another and thus not being that                  
shock absorber they once were. He means that these underlying conditions would make it less difficult                
for KI to become a market maker and facilitate investors themselves. Although, if a blockchain-based               
platform would replace this structure by directly matching municipalities with investors he means that              
a volatility would arise due to large fluctuations in the offers put up by municipalities caused by                 
insufficient financial expertise among the public servants. This expectation is confirmed by the             
financial manager at the medium municipality who thinks the concept of such platform, directly              
matching municipalities to investors, sounds complicated and would exceed her financial competence            
level requiring external consultation. The chief analyst points out that a trend has been observed on                
the west coast where an external consultant has been too-short term in their analyzes and made                
recommendations to municipalities that are in conflict with KI:s view of sound capital management.              
The CIO argues however that one of the reasons with their goal of automating the borrowing process                 
until 2020 is to free up resources to their consultancy department. The treasury manager of the large                 
municipality is positive to a blockchain-based platform, further, the CFO of the large municipality              
also sees great efficiency potential but has an opinion about how the matchmaking should look. 
 
“I imagine that you have some form of a platform where I do not need to contact the 
investors. In some way, it is taken care of by the platform. Should you make bilateral 
agreements directly with the investors, then there are a lot more legal costs” ​CFO, large 
municipality 
 
The senior portfolio manager means that if municipalities would be directly matched with investors              
representing themselves they would face a problem regarding recognition in the international market. 
 
“It works to issue bonds for a smaller municipality in the Swedish capital market, because 
everyone knows who Västerås (small municipality) is, who Västerås city is. But you may not 
know if you are at a central bank in Brazil.”​ Senior portfolio manager 
 
Further, the head of business development points out that placement limits (a financial restriction 
determining how much that can be traded with an actor) is an issue if the municipalities are meant to 
represent themselves since investors might have generous placement limits for a low-risk actor like 
kommuninvest and larger municipalities but might have less generous placement limits for smaller 
municipalities with lower liquidity and credit rating.   
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Discussion 
As a starting point, we address the potential impacts of the blockchain technology to our research                
context by discussing statements of the respondents from KI. The COO/VP mentioned that their              
existence is based on a value-added primarily from a economy of scale model suggesting a more                
pipeline oriented business (Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). However, if the distributed nature of              
blockchain, facilitating peer-to-peer transmission, would render the organization obsolete for the           
better of the municipalities, then she argues that this should be the way forward. This pragmatic view                 
was echoed by the CIO claiming that if they would be able to offer better financing despite                 
disintermediating themselves, that automatically becomes their mission. The chief analyst argued           
however that a blockchain-based platform could be a complement and not a substitute for their current                
business model, suggesting that they should be operated in tandem. This is consistent with Zhu & Furr                 
(2016) arguing that a common denominator for companies who are successful in the transition from               
pipeline business (product producing) to becoming platforms is the employment of a hybrid model.  
 
The decentralized nature of blockchain is likely to have a significant impact on the digital economy                
due to its potential to ensure trust without relying on heavily centralized and proprietary platforms               
which today is the paradigm of e-commerce and governmental institutions (Collomb & Sok, 2016). A               
challenge on the horizon that a blockchain-based lending platform, allowing peer-to-peer in between             
municipalities and towards investors, would raise in this situation is that it would excavate the               
profitability of the so-called market makers, the matchmakers between investors and borrowers,            
reforming conditions in the financial industry. This is because such platform would enable borrowers,              
municipalities in this case, direct access to the investors without liaison with the market makers.               
According to the head of business development, this would likely also delimit the market makers               
incentives to host a secondary market, which is where bonds are exchanged after initially being sold                
which would require this operation to be shouldered by another actor or system. Furthermore, Iansiti               
& Lakhani (2017) argue that blockchain is not a disruptive but a foundational technology meaning               
that it will settle a new foundation for our economic and social systems. These viewpoints of the                 
potential impact of the technology, and the perspective of Iansiti & Lakhani (2017) demonstrate the               
significance and necessity of further analysis of the context rooted in blockchain and reconfirms the               
importance of our research question; ​What blockchain type supports a cooperative lending platform? 
 
Proceeding, the blockchain types will be further discussed below in the following section where six               
elemental properties adopted from Xu et al. (2017) will be addressed; ​trust, transparency, integrity,              
equal rights, cost efficiency, ​and ​flexibility. 
Public 
A notorious feature of a public blockchain is its’ unconditional transparency visible to anyone              
connecting to the network (Xu et al., 2017). This is feature can be used to generate trust, however, the                   
members within the cooperative, both KI, and the municipalities, already have high levels of trust in                
between them. However, it was made apparent that the COO/VP believed that it would be positive if                 
the data on their financial platform would be completely open since their great market share demands                
a high level of transparency to ensure public trust. This would, however, require municipalities to be                
able to defend their positions if inquired by external actors.  
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Xu et al. (2017) argue that a public blockchain strongly enables equal rights, which in a public context                  
would support democratic properties allowing insight into financial terms and conditions. The senior             
portfolio manager argued that a munificent transparency would be positive for their pricing since              
investors would be ensured a credible borrower suggesting that their data should be available for               
investors outside the cooperative. Further, the senior portfolio manager emphasized that public            
transparency is in practice enforced due to the principle that the public should be entitled access to                 
public documents that are not confidential (offentlighetsprincipen) meaning that a public type would             
empower the applicability of the principle. Regarding the public exposure and immutability of             
financial records, this is something the chief analyst argues would simplify traceability of loans and               
various certificates such as green loans, funds that are considered socially and environmentally             
conscious, to be better validated. Xu et al. (2017) argue that a public blockchain has the strongest                 
integrity ensured by cryptographics due to the large distribution of nodes which decimates the risk of                
disproportionate influence in the network, further suggesting that a public type is the best suited to                
achieve credible auditing. The property of immutability is also promoted by the CFO of a large                
municipality who argued that this would simplify and streamline auditing. This aligns with Morabito              
(2017) claiming that blockchain could save vast amounts of money by eliminating trust agencies that               
currently are heavily centralized. On the contrary, the head of business development emphasized a              
potential negative effect the feature of publicly exposed immutability could render. In the case of a                
peer-to-peer platform allowing municipalities to submit borrowing offers he stated that if they would              
be left unanswered, this residual record could harm their price terms since it would imply to investors                 
that this municipality is unfavorable to trade with. Further, the CIO points out that the financial data of                  
municipalities should be handled with respect meaning that a record should be made of who has                
accessed such documents, which would require a system handling this, restraining the feasibility of              
the public type. The financial manager from the medium-sized municipality was concerned that             
competitors to the municipal companies could potentially utilize the access of their financial data in a                
strategic manner suggesting that a public type could be difficult to implement.  
 
Continuing on the track of openness, Boudreau (2010) argues that an open platform governance              
enables swift adoption of users generating momentum for the platform required to claim market              
presence. However, in the case of KI, a vast majority of their customers, Swedish municipalities, has                
already adopted to their cooperative, diminishing the need for such adoption. Cennamo & Santaló              
(2015) means that an aggressive launch strategy, facilitating many comparable actors (investors in this              
case) could evoke a price war, the cooperative as a force leveraging the bargaining power of the                 
clients could further be argued to increase this effect. This could be seen as an alternative mechanism                 
to make use of in order to regulate prices in favor for the municipalities, further motivated by the                  
pragmatic view of the COO/VP meaning that whatever is economically lucrative for the             
municipalities is plausible. However, in the wake of such evolution, a condition limiting the feasibility               
of the public type is how to incentivize investors outside the cooperative to participate. Cusumano               
(2010) argues that in order to become an industrywide platform, companies must, through their              
strategy, financially incentivize complementors, which can be done by subsidizing or having low or              
no fees to join. This notion of providing economic incentives for participation is also true for public                 
blockchains and Buterin (2015) means that this is manifested through cryptoeconomics which most             
commonly is carried out through a cryptocurrency, raising the question whether it is in KI:s interest to                 
host such. Finally, distributing nodes in a blockchain outside the cooperative might conflict with the               
business model, meant to serve the public institutions (municipalities) as well as it reduces the               
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flexibility of the blockchain when involving other members than those of the cooperative. According              
to Xu et al. (2017) the public option is also the least cost-effective seen to its democratic properties                  
entailing inertia in decision-making. Further, the chief analyst argued that a central governance is              
necessitated if KI is supposed to be able to counteract a high price dissemination in borrowing terms                 
in order to nurse the cooperatives’ best intentions which reduce the applicability of the public type.  
 
To summarize the applicability of the public scope we have addressed the elemental properties              
inspired from Xu el al. (2017); trust, transparency, integrity, equal rights, cost efficiency, and              
flexibility. First, trust, where KI has a remarkably high level of trust, which mean they lack the                 
necessity to construct a mechanism to establish trust, therefore, a public blockchain is not the optimal                
solution. Regarding transparency, this is prominent in the public blockchain type allowing for great              
audibility as well as empowering the applicability of the principle that the public should be entitled                
access to public documents that are not confidential (offentlighetsprincipen). In order to ensure the              
verity of the data on the blockchain, the elementary property of integrity is the strongest in the public                  
type due to the great number of nodes verifying the blockchain making the public type the strongest                 
option. Regarding equal rights, the public type can be argued to be the best option due to its                  
democratic virtue, however, in the context of KI these rights should be delimited to the members of                 
the cooperative. The public type is the least cost-efficient due to the inertia from the vastly distributed                 
democratic process disqualifying it from a feasible option in the context of KI’s cooperative. Finally,               
the flexibility of a public type is too inert in order to allow the cooperative to facilitate sufficient                  
change and be able to adapt to their owners’ intentions. 
Private 
Xu et al. (2017) argue that private blockchains, unlike public, require a high level of pre-established                
trust to found a sound governance mechanism within the technology. The higher level of trust               
between parties, the lesser need to eliminate distrust of actions by mechanisms of consensus, thereby               
with high-level of trust comes great privacy​. The COO/VP describes the organizational structure of KI               
to be a bit special due to the cooperative structure, i.e. owned by its customers. In principle, there                  
should be no conflicting relationships with stakeholders and allows the enterprise to serve the interest               
of the public, thereby a mutual trust is created between the parties. Consequently, she argues that KI                 
as a financial institution has a better position to build trust in comparison to a regular bank, as banks                   
have to produce a return to shareholders potentially return to various bonus programs, where KI has to                 
produce value to their members. Morabito (2017) argues that there is an immense opportunity to cut                
costs of trust agencies through blockchain, similarly, KI could potentially use blockchain as a tool to                
substitute parts of their own trust generation function, thereby liberate resource which could but              
utilized to further improve loan term for its members. The head of Business development and the                
senior portfolio manager confirms that KI´s level of trust is high both within the cooperative and                
externally due to well-managed funds. The representatives from the municipalities confirm that the             
level of trust to KI is high, due to transparency, valuable cooperation and practices with KI. We argue                  
that these views presents a clear picture that KI has a remarkably high level of trust, and based on Xu                    
et al.´s (2017) argument, this means that the cooperative structure fits well in private blockchain.  
 
The notion of the financial manager of the medium-sized municipality indicates that the trust might               
not be perfect, as she would need further intel of the intentions of KI´s consultancy practices.                
Moreover, the CIO argues that they intend to diminish the control mechanisms regulating the              
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borrowing process to the municipalities, consequently entitling municipalities more trust than           
previously. These examples demonstrate the need for further trust generation within the cooperative.             
Boudreau (2010) argues that it is vital for a platform owner to adequately balance control mechanisms                
in order to accommodate motivation and maximize value proposition, this is also echoed by Parker &                
Alstyne (2014) that argues that the level of openness can significantly alter the participation and               
motivation of investment from platform partners. KI´s ambition to minimize control could lead to a               
greater motivation from its member to invest more time in their platform, yet, possibly decrease the                
targeted value of correct borrowing application. The COO/VP and CIO both argues that the main role                
of KI is to produce the best loan terms for the members. An argument from the Head of business                   
development and the Senior portfolio manager is that higher level of trust generates better              
creditworthiness for municipalities, thereby better loan terms. Thereby we argue that even if the trust               
is high within the cooperative and externally, it is in KI´s interest to increase it further, in fact, it is                    
their mission to do so. Based on Xu et al.´s (2017) definitions, this implies that KI should not                  
constrain themselves within the limits of trust generation in a private blockchain, and rather, should               
aim for the opposite direction as much as possible. 
 
The treasury manager and CFO of the large municipalities argue that one component of KI´s               
trustworthiness is their high level of transparency, and would be happy to see their data on KI finans                  
(KI´s platform) to be completely open to the public. This is further confirmed by the senior portfolio                 
manager, that sees transparency as a tool to increase trust, the more transparency, the more trust will                 
be given to KI and the cooperative. However, the chief analyst in KI provides a different perspective,                 
where KI chose to limit the access of financial data in their platform. Only the municipality in                 
question and their dedicated account manager along with the research department got access, this was               
seen as a measure to increase trust, yet this is somewhat contradicting to previous viewpoints and                
arguments. Further, she speculates that the remaining financial industry i.e. banks, might not want to               
keep this data fully open, as it could increase the potential of undercutting prices, which KI also needs                  
to take into consideration. Morabito (2017) argues that private blockchains seem to fit well with               
corporations in need of control and need of preserving sensitive data as it could be exploited by                 
competitors. We argue that this is not the case of KI, as the COO/VP of KI argues that there is no                     
reason for KI´s individual existence if there is a better solution for their members than what KI offers,                  
then that should lead the way. This is further echoed by the CIO that says if there is anything that                    
could give better financing to the members, then that should also become KI´s mission, even if it                 
means disintermediating themselves. Based on these perspectives and previous arguments, we argue            
that it would be beneficial to make the data on KI finans fully readable to the public as it would                    
increase the trust within the cooperative and to external interestees. Even if the scenario arises of                
competitors undercutting KI´s prices, that just means better loan terms for KI´s members, in fact, this                
change should be welcomed by KI. Further, this can be connected to Iansiti & Levien´s (2004)                
concept of a ‘keystone strategy’, where a firm strategically dedicate resources in order to improve the                
ecosystem and its actors (businesses) within it, consequently, leveraging itself as a more central node               
within the ecosystem, strengthening its position. Strategically, KI could see this change as an              
opportunity to foster a new praxis designed by their ecosystem, strengthen their position, and provide               
better loan term for their members. Thereby, KI should aim for a greater level of transparency, and in                  
regards to Morabito´s (2017) arguments of sensitive data and Xu et al.´s (2017) definition of private                
blockchain, the cooperative does not align well with private blockchain.  
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The COO/VP of KI argues that the primary value of KI:s business model is built on the economy of                   
scale, where they are representing a large number of municipalities meaning larger amounts of money,               
providing greater loan terms. The CIO of KI further argues that their ongoing process of automation                
takes aim at minimizing cost and simplifying the loan process for municipalities. As KI´s mission is to                 
provide the best possible loan terms for their members, diminishing operational costs are central to               
further enhance this vision. Xu et al. (2017) and Buterin (2015) argues that a private blockchain is less                  
financially heavy to create, govern, maintain and develop, as well as better performance due to less                
rigorous authentication requirements due to the already established trust within the chain. Based on              
this dimension, a private blockchain would support KI´s ambitions of cost efficiency. Furthermore,             
the CIO and Chief analyst of KI argues that it is not clear whether the municipalities should be                  
granted governance rights and maintenance obligations of a blockchain solution, rather it could be              
vital to discuss if the technology should be run centrally (within KI) by technocrats, which would                
align well with a private blockchain, however, both emphasize the importance of including the              
municipalities perspectives. If KI seeks to control the technology centrally, based on Parker & Alstyne               
(2014), it might affect the interest of participation from the value creator of the platform. They further                 
argue that orchestrating the buyers’ requirements in a platform is paramount in order to drive               
adoption. Therefore, it might be wise for KI to consider providing governance rights to the               
municipalities in a blockchain platform, as it could enrich value brought and increase participation.              
This proposes that KI should not design a blockchain platform based on KI´s single participation,               
further disqualifying a private blockchain defined by Xu et al. (2017). 
 
To summarize the applicability of the private scope we have addressed the elemental properties              
inspired from Xu el al. (2017); trust, transparency, integrity, equal rights, cost efficiency, and              
flexibility. First, trust, even if KI has a remarkably high level of trust, there have been doubts of bias                   
profit agenda, further KI´s ambition is to increase the level of trust further, thereby suggesting that a                 
private blockchain would not align well with their ambitions. Regarding transparency, it is seen as a                
central element for building trust, thereby a private blockchain could limit the trust-building             
mechanism. Further, the verity of the data is vastly limited with a private blockchain and could restrict                 
the potential of green loans and external auditability. Regarding equal rights, the private blockchain              
would not fit well with KI´s current structure as a cooperative owned by municipalities where mutual                
decision making is essential. As KI would like to optimize costs in order to provide great loan terms,                  
this aligns well with the characteristics of a private blockchain as computations would only need to                
run at one actor. Finally, in order achieve long-term stability for its members, it is important for KI to                   
facilitate a sufficient amount of bureaucracy in order to counteract potential price dissemination and              
volatility, thereby a highly flexible blockchain type such as private diminishes in necessity.  
Consortium 
Just as Normark (1996) argues that the cooperative organization as a way to coordinate economic               
activity constitutes an equilibrium between monopsony and monopoly, the blockchain consortium           
type is an equivalent counterpart in between fully private networks and publicly distributed ones.              
Buterin (2015) means that the consortium type is applicable in a context facilitating several              
organizations, distributing authority to several nodes. The COO/VP emphasizes that the owner            
conditions of KI as a cooperative enterprise owned by municipalities means that there are in principle                
no conflicting stakeholder relationships which allow the enterprise to substantially serve the interests             
of the public. Buterin (2015) argues that if the nodes or validators are previously entrusted the risk of                  
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adversarial or disproportionate influence on the network can be eliminated, disqualifying the need of a               
public type. Further, in a consortium, only the member nodes need to validate transactions which are                
far cheaper compared to a public blockchain where the number of nodes can be huge which also                 
decelerates transaction speed (Buterin, 2015; Xu et al., 2017).  
 
The end-user of KIs borrowing operation are the municipal officials in their respective financial              
departments. This means that if the peer-to-peer feature of blockchain is to be achieved in a                
cooperative context, it would make sense if nodes were distributed to the municipalities where the               
interaction to the lending platform would take place. Further, the COO argued that there is a strength                 
in risk spreading, referring to the owner directives governing the organization. If such voting process               
would be distributed and fully traceable on a blockchain this would empower this intention. Drawing               
upon platform governance literature, Parker & Alstyne (2014) argues that third party complementors             
have greater negotiating influence and leverage to protect their value from exploitation if they are               
entitled stronger intellectual property rights by the platform owner. Conversely, if they feel that the               
platform owner intends to exploit their position they might be deterred from participation. This can be                
translated to the situation where one of the financial managers expressed that they are not fully                
convinced that KI is completely individual and devoid of a profit agenda of their own. Consequently,                
if that manager knew that their department operated a node of their own in the network, we argue that                   
this would confer them increased influence which would support the cooperatives notion of shared              
power. Further, Kenney & Zysman (2016) argues that the nature of platforms, cutting out the               
middleman, often mean that they outcompete rivaling companies allowing them to appropriate large             
shares of the value created by the members of the platform. This means that power becomes                
centralized to the platform owner, arguably weakening the economic incentives Cusumano (2010)            
means are paramount to economically incentivize participation.  
 
Applying the consortium type, distributing nodes to the member organizations, is further aligned with              
the CIO who argued that KIs level of control is meant to decrease whereupon the municipalities are                 
scheduled to be more autonomous in the future as a part of the organizations’ intention to be more                  
automated. However, as made apparent by the COO/VP and chief analyst, there are reasons to why KI                 
should possess greater influence than each of the member nodes. Firstly, because the COO/VP argued               
that the operative board of directors has to be able to make business decisions on their own initiative.                  
Secondly, because the chief analyst pointed out that in the case of an emerging unhealthy dept growth                 
in a municipality, KI has to be able to intervene and limit their borrowing. Thirdly because the chief                  
analyst argued that they have to be able to counteract a high price dissemination in the borrowing                 
terms between small and large municipalities. Fourthly, because KI has to be able to standardize the                
design of the possible trading options on the platform, based on the standpoint from the head of                 
business development and the senior portfolio manager who argued that unregulated peer-to-peer            
activity would increase price volatility leading to unfavorable borrowing terms. However, the chief             
analyst pointed out that the current processes for the account managers, handling borrowing requests,              
are highly ambiguous and independently established inhibiting a shared benchmark. This highly            
manual process needs to be adjusted prior to the launch of such lending platform based on Zhu & Furr                   
(2016) who argues that a platform presupposes a sufficiently designed original product. The head of               
business development argued that a peer-to-peer platform would eat into the profitability of the              
market makers to such an extent that he questioned whether they would continue to operate, leading to                 
the question whether KI could facilitate investors themselves.  
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Implying a need for conformability, considering whether a new type of member should be acquired               
requires the blockchain to be flexible. Xu et al. (2017) argue that consortium blockchains facilitate               
flexibility through their permission management component, which infers the process where novel            
members are authorized by the existing ones, enabling safeguarding and scalability. This feature also              
allows the consortium to allocate readability rights to their blockchain to actors outside the              
cooperative which has been advocated by the COO/VP in order to increase the transparency level of                
the organization and further by the CFO of a large municipality pointing out how it could simplify                 
auditing.  
 
To summarize the applicability of the consortium scope we have addressed the elemental properties              
inspired from Xu el al. (2017); trust, transparency, integrity, equal rights, cost efficiency, and              
flexibility. First, trust where it has been made apparent that the level of trust in the cooperative is high                   
but there have been doubts of a biased profit agenda which makes the consortium, facilitating several                
actors to participate an optimal blockchain type. Since KI strive to maintain high levels of               
transparency to generate trust from financial institutions as well as the public, the consortium is               
deemed too restricted to support this aim. Regarding the verity of data on the blockchain the                
consortium is not as solid as the public type which disqualifies the consortium to best support data                 
integrity. For the cooperative, equal rights are deemed important to facilitate the mutual participation              
in the cooperative making the consortium an optimal choice. The property of cost efficiency is less                
accommodated in the consortium than in the unicellular private type which disqualifies the consortium              
as the most cost-efficient. Finally, an optimal level of flexibility is accommodated in the consortium               
type since it is both sufficiently malleable to incrementally implement changes on the platform whilst               
at the same time stable enough to support long-term stability for its members. 
Breakdown of the discussion 
Based on previous discussion points within each type, we would like to establish how well KI´s                
cooperative lending platform would align with Xu et al.´s (2017) blockchain types based on six               
characteristics. First, the level of trust is remarkably high in their cooperative, which presents a picture                
that aligns well with a private blockchain, however, the trust is not perfect. Additionally, it is in KI´s                  
interest to increase the trust further, thereby distributing the control and visibility of the data further                
could be a way to approach this. Consequently, based on this dimension, we argue that KI should                 
utilize a consortium structure. Secondly, almost all respondents were positive for a fully public              
readability of the data of KI finans, we argue that this aligns well with a public blockchain. Third,                  
Integrity, the verity of the data, is also considered a priority for the cooperative as they would like to                   
verify the ​greenness ​of funds, the traceability of funds, and establishing the possibility of higher               
credibility from rating institutes, this would place the cooperative under public as well. Fourth, equal               
rights, as the cooperative structure discriminates external interestees by only providing fund to its              
members, as well as the ownership rights of KI, this argues for possible synergies of utilizing a                 
blockchain that does not only serve one organization, nor allows all participation, yet welcomes all               
members of the cooperative for participation, thus a consortium blockchain would be beneficial for              
this aspect. Fifth, as KI´s mission is to provide better loan terms to its members, heavily reflected by                  
the way of managing business by economy of scale, as well as automation is central to reduce costs,                  
we argue this present the perspective of utilizing a cost-efficient and a high-performance blockchain              
would deem beneficial for KI, i.e a private blockchain. Sixth, If KI would like to enlarge their scale of                   
their blockchain to include more features or participants, this is important to consider before              
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considering type structure, where KI would need enough flexibility to facilitate the change, yet              
enough bureaucracy to limit volatility and establish stability and amongst the member municipalities,             
we argue that a consortium blockchain would be optimal to facilitate this. This figure below illustrates                
the aforementioned six characteristics and the alignment of a cooperative lending platform.  
 
Figure 4. Conceptualization of how the blockchain types fit the case study. 
 
Based on the previously discussed characteristics; trust, transparency, integrity, equal rights, cost            
efficiency and flexibility, we can clearly see benefits of utilizing a more centralized private              
blockchain. However, the benefits of possible gains with public blockchain in forms of transparency              
and verity of data, outweighs these cost benefits. Yet, as it is a cooperative, KI is ruled by and is                    
serving their members; the municipalities, and needs to facilitate enough stability and flexibility,             
distribute sufficient control to accommodate its members, and continue building trust with current             
blockchain solutions. Ultimately, we argue that a consortium blockchain leaning towards an            
incremental pursuit for a public blockchain, which incorporate fully public reading accessibility of the              
data, would be the optimal way to support a cooperative lending platform for KI and their member                 
municipalities. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this study ​was to answer what blockchain type supports a cooperative lending platform. To                 
examine this, a case study with an abductive approach was conducted to analyse a financial institute                
and its symbiotic relationships within their cooperative. Six elemental properties of blockchain            
technology were evaluated where three points towards that the blockchain type that supports a              
cooperative lending platform is the consortium blockchain. One property support the private            
blockchain, ​cost efficiency​, whilst two support the public blockchain in form of ​transparency ​and              
verity of data (​integrity​). Yet, as a cooperative, ruled by and serving the members, it needs to balance                  
flexibility ​and facilitate enough stability, distribute sufficient control to accommodate its members,            
maintaining ​equal rights, ​and continue building ​trust​. Concludingly, a consortium blockchain leaning            
towards an incremental pursuit for the characteristics of a public blockchain, which incorporate             
entirely public reading accessibility of the data, whilst write-permission is kept within the cooperative,              
would be the optimal blockchain type to support a cooperative lending platform.  
 
Further studies 
The limitation of this was to not include consensus mechanisms and deeper nature of cryptography. 
As we have answered what type of blockchain that supports cooperative lending platforms, 
consequently, the question of what type of consensus mechanisms that supports a cooperative lending 
platform is evoked. Moreover, we would also like to endorse exploring further practical applications 
aligned with possible design choices of a consortium blockchain, some suggested in our study, and 
examine the feasibility of said practical applications. 
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Appendix 
Appendix I: ​Interview-kommuninvest 
What blockchain type supports a cooperative lending platform? 
********************************************************************************** 
- Jonas och Carl-Marcus, masterstudenter från GU som studerar blockchain. 
- För att undersöka om blockchain är relevant för KI kommer vi att fråga om: relation till 
kommuner, integritet och plattform. 
- Intervjumallen är likadan oberoende av roll på KI, svara utifrån er förmåga. 
********************************************************************************** 
Berätta lite om din roll på KI ​(Hur ser en arbetsdag ut för dig?) 
 
Relation till Kommuner 
 
Hur skulle du beskriva er relation med kommunerna? 
 
Hur skulle du beskriva er tillit kommunerna? 
Hur skiljer sig kommuninvests tillit mellan olika kommuner? 
 
Hur skiljer sig lånevillkoren mellan olika kommuner?  
 
Vilka exempel på erfarenheter med <kommun/investerare> anser ni varit: 
● bra 
● mindre bra 
 
Om en blockchain-plattform som ersättning för den låneprocess ni idag erbjuder skulle utvecklas, i 
vilken grad bedömer du att kommunerna bör vara involverade i:  
utvecklingen av en sådan? 
styrningen av en sådan? 
 
Hur ser ni på möjligheten att kommuner kan bedriva utlåning till andra kommuner? (Om en plattform 
gör det möjligt att matcha kommuner och investerare utan er intermediering) 
● Hur stor tillit har ni till att kommunerna fortsätter att sköta sina lån genom er 
plattform och inte går till investerarna direkt? 
○ Vad innebär det för en sådan plattform att investerare är både partners och 
konkurrent till plattformen?  
 
Integritet 
Hur känsliga är de uppgifter som ni delar med respektive kommun för andra parter? Exempel på 
detta? (​lånevillkor?) 
● Vad skulle vara öppen/stängd data i så fall? 
○ Hur skulle ni ställa er till att KI finans (plattformen) data skulle vara helt öppen? 
● Att historiken är bestående? (Vad som en gång exponerats är alltid tillgängligt) ​Immutability 
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Plattform 
Vilka är de viktigaste utvecklingsprojekten för plattformen? 
● Vilken av dem skulle ni säga är huvudprioritering? 
● (Hur arbetar ni med innovation?) 
 
Vilka exempel på erfarenheter med KI finans (plattformen) anser ni varit: 
● mindre bra 
● Hur styr ni användarbetenden? 
● Hur har det förändrats? 
● Hur regleras ‘dåligt betende’? 
 
Avslutningsvis: 
● Är där något ytterligare du tycker vi ska belysa? 
● Är där någon mer som vi borde prata med enligt dig? 
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Appendix II: ​Interview-kommun 
Skall besvara -> ​What blockchain type supports a cooperative lending platform? 
********************************************************************************** 
- Jonas och Carl-Marcus, masterstudenter från GU som studerar blockchain. 
- För att undersöka om blockchain är relevant för KI kommer vi att fråga om: relation till KI, 
integritet och plattform. 
- Intervjumallen är likadan oberoende av kommun, svara utifrån er förmåga. 
********************************************************************************** 
 
Relation till KI 
 
Hur skulle du beskriva er relation med kommuninvest? 
 
Hur skulle du beskriva er tillit till kommuninvest? 
Vilka är dem olika rollerna hos er som arbetar mot KI? 
Hur är dynamiken mellan dem olika roller? 
 
Har ni några exempel på erfarenheter med kommuninvest ni anser varit: 
● bra 
● mindre bra 
 
Hur skulle du ställa dig till om kommuninvest utvecklade en plattform som gör det möjligt att matcha 
er direkt till investerarna utan kommuninvests intermediering? 
 
Om en blockchain-plattform som ersättning för den låneprocess ni idag skulle utvecklas, i vilken grad 
bedömer du att kommunerna bör vara involverade i:  
utvecklingen av en sådan? 
styrningen av en sådan? 
 
Hur ser ni på möjligheten att kommuner kan bedriva utlåning till andra kommuner? (Om en plattform 
gör det möjligt att matcha kommuner och investerare utan er intermediering) 
● Hur stort intresse skulle ni ha för att fortsätta driva belåning genom plattformen och 
inte gå till investerarna direkt? 
 
Relation till investerare 
Vilken relation har ni till KI:s investerare? 
-Finns där ett intresse att ha det? 
 
Integritet 
Hur känsliga är de uppgifter som ni delar med KI för andra parter? Exempel på detta? (​lånevillkor?) 
● Vad skulle vara öppen/stängd data i så fall? 
○ Hur skulle ni ställa er till att KI finans (plattformen) data skulle vara helt öppen? 
● Att historiken är bestående? (Vad som en gång exponerats är alltid tillgängligt) ​Immutability 
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Plattform 
Vilka exempel på erfarenheter med KI finans (plattformen) anser ni varit: 
● mindre bra 
 
Känner du att vi adresserat alla frågor relevanta för intervjun eller skulle du vilja lägga till något? 
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